The Computational Theory of Mind

Based on the provided context, the question of whether meditation is relevant among intentional realism, eliminativism, and intermediate positions is not directly addressed. However, we can attempt to provide a reasonable answer based on existing knowledge.

Meditation is a practice that involves training the mind to focus and redirect thoughts. It is often associated with various philosophical and spiritual traditions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism. From a philosophical perspective, the question of how meditation relates to intentional realism, eliminativism, and intermediate positions would depend on how one conceptualizes the nature of meditation and its relationship to mental states.

Intentional realism, as mentioned in the context, holds that representational properties are genuine aspects of mentality. If one considers meditation as a practice that involves intentional mental states, such as focusing on a specific object or cultivating certain qualities of mind, then intentional realism may be relevant in understanding and describing the mental processes involved in meditation.

Eliminativism, on the other hand, dismisses intentional description as problematic and recommends abandoning representational content in scientific psychology. If one takes an eliminativist stance towards intentional states, they may argue that meditation does not involve genuine intentional mental states but rather can be explained in terms of physiological or neurological processes. In this view, meditation may be seen as a purely physical or cognitive process without any need for intentional descriptions.

Intermediate positions, as mentioned in the context, refer to various positions that lie between intentional realism and eliminativism. These positions may acknowledge the usefulness of intentional descriptions in predicting and explaining behavior but may question the ontological status of intentional mental states. In the context of meditation, an intermediate position might argue that while intentional descriptions can be useful in understanding the subjective experience and effects of meditation, they may not necessarily correspond to distinct mental states with representational properties.

In summary, the relevance of meditation among intentional realism, eliminativism, and intermediate positions would depend on how one conceptualizes the nature of meditation and its relationship to intentional mental states. Different philosophical perspectives may offer different interpretations and explanations for the practice of meditation.